

and the remainder divided between the army, navy, and marines. Even as the Vietnam War expanded, U.S. force levels in Japan continued to decline.

By the mid-1960s, the United States all but abandoned its effort to promote large-scale Japanese rearmament. The self-defense forces totaled around 250,000 throughout the decade. In place of size, the Defense Department pressed Japan to improve the quality of its air and maritime forces. As a result, Japan's military evolved into an efficient defense force with little offensive capability.

The repair, communication, ammunition and oil storage, and recreational facilities the U.S. military retained in Japan were critical components of Asian defense strategy. These installations, along with those in Okinawa, Guam, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, formed a coordinated network east of Hawaii. Bases on Okinawa were especially vital to the air war in Vietnam. One million military transport and combat flights originated in the Ryukyus between 1965 and 1973. KC 135 tanker planes refueled B-52 bombers flying from Guam to Indochina, and the B-52s sometimes flew directly from the Ryukyus. Unrestricted by the 1960 security treaty, American forces stored chemical and nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Nearly three-fourths of the 400,000 tons of supplies required each month by American troops in Vietnam passed through Japan.

By the mid-1960s, the U.S. Navy was also heavily dependent on Japanese facilities. In December of that year, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, declared that "without Okinawa we couldn't continue fighting the Vietnam War."

As the Vietnam War escalated, American analysts noted that Japan's strategic importance to the United States had increased.

By making it more costly for Seventh Fleet vessels to return to Hawaii or the West Coast for maintenance and repair, the navy at bases in Japan saved hundreds of millions of dollars a year in peacetime, and would have even greater logistics value in certain war situations, as the Korean War showed. Ammunition and aircraft storage sites, repair facilities, and an industrial infrastructure made Japan the linchpin for the U.S. defense posture in East and South Asia. A Senate subcommittee on military preparedness concluded in April 1966 that "it would be very difficult to fight the war in Southeast Asia without [bases] at Yokosuka and Sasebo."

Although the security treaty barred the United States from introducing nuclear weapons to Japan without permission, the secret protocol of 1960 permitted nuclear-laden planes and ships to "transit" through the country. American war plans and informal procedures followed by local commanders stretched this loophole even further. Air force transport planes stationed on Pacific islands were assigned, in case of a war alert, to transport

nuclear weapons to U.S. air bases in Japan without obtaining Tokyo's approval. The weapons would then be deployed against targets in North-east Asia.³⁷

While visiting Japan in the early 1960s as a Rand Corporation analyst working on a Pentagon study, Daniel Ellsberg uncovered a more serious violation of the security treaty. The small marine air base at Iwakuni, on the Inland Sea, had a handful of planes assigned to attack some two dozen targets in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. The marines arranged with local navy officials to store nuclear bombs on an LST barge (the "San Joaquin County") semi-permanently moored a few hundred yards offshore. If needed, the motorized barge would approach the beach and send its bombs ashore on amphibious tractors directly to the marine airfield. Neither civilian nor military commanders in Washington seemed aware of this. Navy records, Ellsberg discovered, listed the LST as docked in Okinawa. The arrangement was "regarded as super-secret from the Japanese" and from civilians in the Pentagon.

The barge's vulnerability to sabotage and the high risk of public disclosure of its cargo prompted Ellsberg to criticize the operation as hare-brained. Exposure might bring down the Japanese government, lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations, or even drive Japan toward communism.

Paul Nitze and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara as the "most tactically irresponsible action it was possible to imagine." Ellsberg pressed the navy to remedy the problem; top admirals denounced the move.

The nuclear weapons barge remained in place until the spring of 1966, when someone — *maybe Ellsberg* — leaked word to Reischauer. *DE, Oral History Not for Grot*
was was struck by the information. In the heat of circumstances, it represented a breach of trust. He thought its presence in the harbor was a violation of the security treaty and a breach of trust. He thought it was a violation of the security treaty and a breach of trust. He thought it was a violation of the security treaty and a breach of trust.
 Reischauer grew wild with fear. *Paul was absolutely right. He had thought that*
 known about the vessel and tacitly approved it. The envoy threatened to resign unless Rusk ordered its swift removal. Rusk complied, but the incident widened the gulf between the two men. *My wife, Paul, 199*

By this time, Reischauer found it nearly impossible to defend the policies of the Johnson administration. His rapport with Republicans had been eroded by their opposition to a Vietnam policy he believed in. Even before this latest incident, he decided to leave and return to Harvard during the summer of 1966. Once again, Rusk and Johnson stymied his effort. Declining to accept his earlier request to resign, the president and secretary of state called him in July and then called Reischauer back to Washington for consultation.

Johnson met with Reischauer for an hour on July 22. The ambassador hoped to speak about the damage America's China and Vietnam policies

Sato to send emissaries to neutral and Communist countries in pursuit of peace in Vietnam. However, Harriman made clear, any settlement must be based on "America's position of strength." Humphrey took a conciliatory approach, urging the prime minister to "take a more active role in South-east Asian development" and promote a "greater Japanese presence and participation in South Vietnam." The vice president suggested that "the Japanese might wish to provide full medical services for one or more provinces in Vietnam." Little came of these ideas.³⁰

The Japanese business community, concerned about American trade retaliation, urged Sato to placate Washington. Early in 1966, the prime minister issued public statements critical of China's nuclear program and recent H-bomb test. He restricted government credit to Beijing and barred a Chinese trade delegation from visiting Japan. Foreign Minister Shiina announced that in light of the security treaty, "Japan was not in a neutral position vis-à-vis the United States and North Vietnam." America fought to "maintain the security of the Far East" so Japan "had an obligation to furnish facilities and territories for this purpose."³¹

China lost no time in alerting Japan to the risks it courted by following the American lead in Vietnam. In February, 1966, a ranking Chinese official said:

...in Vietnam, the official stated, "the U.S. bombs China, unfortunately the U.S. is out of our reach. We are not able to return the blow. However, it is not impossible for us to reach Japan." The threat, American analysts agreed, sought to "push Japan over the edge and persuade the U.S. to restrain the scope of its operations in Vietnam."³²

Japanese opposition to U.S. involvement opposed the war on nationalist grounds and out of concern that Japan would be dragged into the conflict because of its security ties with the United States. *Behrezen* opposed peace in Vietnam, self-determination for the Vietnamese, and cessation of Japanese complicity in the war. The movement maintained a separate identity from the Socialist and Communist parties, which opposed the war on more ideological grounds and saw the nonpartisan anti-war activists as something of a threat to their following. *Behrezen* leaders and publications accused the Sato government of being a co-conspirator with, not a passive accomplice to, the war. *Demos* in front of the U.S. embassy became so frequent by mid-1965 that riot police assumed a nearly permanent presence. Between 1965 and 1970, some eighteen million Japanese demonstrated against the Vietnam War.³³

Opinion surveys during the years 1965 to 1968 found a sizeable majority of Japanese opposed to supporting Vietnam and expanding the ground war. Respondents were also disturbed with the Viet Cong goal of toppling the Saigon regime. In 1968, at the height of American escalation, two-thirds of Japanese polled favored adopting a more neutral foreign

policy. Only 20 percent wanted to continue the security treaty with the United States after 1970 when it could be ended. (Support for the alliance increased in 1969 when Nixon began removing troops from Vietnam.)

Despite these trends, neither grassroots nor elite opposition to the war ever threatened Sato's domination of the LDP or the party's monopoly of power. The anti-war movement failed to arouse the depth of passion that the anti-security treaty movement had in 1960. Many Japanese opposed the war, but still voted for the LDP.

The structure of Japanese politics and the LDP further mitigated the impact of the anti-war movement. Prime ministers were chosen by Diet members, not voters. LDP faction leaders controlled blocs of Diet members in the bargaining process that resulted in selection of a party leader/prime minister. Party barons and their followers forged and broke alliances to gain control of cabinet posts, patronage, and rewards for constituents and campaign donors. Whenever possible, they avoided embracing popular causes or grappling with divisive issues. The Vietnam War was not so overwhelming a concern among voters as to force the LDP to take heed of anti-war sentiment or risk losing its Diet majority.

When the Vietnam War escalated, the United States spent about \$7 million on money in subsidies to sympathetic newspapers and magazines and to individual members of the Democratic Socialist and Liberal Democratic parties. Americans made a special effort to influence politicians on Okinawa, where popular opposition to the use of bases for Vietnam operations provoked

...the importance of keeping the lid on in Okinawa. In discussing the plan with military officials, his concern focused on assuring that leading national figures in "the Japanese LDP (rather than the party's Okinawa branch)" served as the primary conduit of American funds. This was "the most effective way" to assure both success and stealth. Deputy Undersecretary of the Army John M. Steadman agreed that security was critical because if the "U.S. is caught with its hand in the cookie jar there will be a serious blow up in Japan."³⁴

The American Military in Japan

In 1952, over 200,000 American military personnel remained on 15,000 bases and installations in Japan. These numbers shrank steadily the next decade. By 1964 (excluding facilities and personnel on Okinawa, 45,000 military dependents, and the sailors of the Japan-based Seventh Fleet), the United States maintained in Japan twelve large bases, 136 other facilities, and 46,000 military personnel. Half of them were in the air force

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were doing throughout Asia. But Johnson delivered a harangue about anti-war senators who undermined his policies. Dispirited, Reischauer left the White House and ventured to the Senate where he shared his doubts with Senator William Fulbright and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Three days later, the State Department announced his resignation and the selection of career diplomat U. Alexis Johnson as ambassador to Tokyo.⁴⁰

The war dogged Reischauer's final days in Tokyo. At farewell receptions he attended, "groups of vociferous young Americans and Japanese" stood at the entrance to the buildings "shouting protests against America's Vietnam policies." At one event the protestors even included "an acquaintance," Professor Howard Zinn of Boston University. Reischauer could "never forget him wildly beating on a drum in an effort to spoil the party given in Haru's honor."⁴¹

Japan and the Economic Dimensions of the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War had a greater economic than political impact on Japan. From 1965 to 1972, Japanese exports to the United States rose from \$4.4 billion to \$14.8 billion, expanded rapidly as the Pentagon procured Vietnam-related material in Japan and surrounding countries. Military orders encouraged technological transfer and innovation. With American industry producing at full capacity, ever higher levels of Japanese exports found a permanent niche in the U.S. consumer market. The expenditure of billions of war-related dollars in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, and the influx of U.S. troops and military equipment into Japan, all stimulated the Japanese economy.

MITI and American government agencies compiled gross national product (GNP) data in calculating the war's economic impact on Japan. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry had the best data, but issued the figures with caveats. MITI's analyses in order to dampen charges of war profiteering. Treasury officials used numbers close to the mid-range estimates of the Japanese Finance Ministry and private banks. All calculations came on top of the \$340 million "base" level of U.S. procurements in Japan in 1964. They also accounted for the fact that exports to the United States from Southeast Asia were on an upward curve when escalation began.

MITI data for 1965 to 1972 indicates that Japan earned at least \$7 billion in "extra" sales of goods and services related to Vietnam. This included \$1.77 billion in direct procurement by U.S. forces in Japan; \$2.83 billion in indirect procurement by Vietnam and countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; and almost \$2 billion in indirect procurement in terms of additional exports to the United States made possible by the war. Japan earned at least \$1 billion per year and possibly as much as \$1.5 billion from the Vietnam War.⁴²

MITI Estimates of Japan's Earnings from Vietnam War, 1965-72 (in U.S. dollars on top of 1964 base of \$340 million)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Direct procurement	6	134	188	251	303	323	28	285
Exports to U.S.	—	55	246	369	438	371	256	162
Indirect procurement by Asian nations	77	256	392	444	517	404	400	400
Totals	83	445	826	1,064	1,258	1,098	937	847

MITI officials minimized Vietnam's impact by comparing war orders to total GNP. They noted that Korean-era procurement totaled about \$1.8 billion in an economy only a sixth as large as that of Japan in the Vietnam era. Procurement at the peak of the Korean War represented 10 percent of the value of all Japanese exports, while during the Vietnam War they were about 12 percent of total exports. But however small, Vietnam had a huge impact on the pace and direction of economic growth.

Under MITI guidance, the Japanese government purchased rubber boots, sandbags, and barbed wire by direct purchase from the United States. Japan (APA) expanded its purchases to cotton cloth, rubber, petroleum, cement, sheet iron, motorcycles, synthetic fibers, transceivers, and instant foodstuffs, electronic equipment, as well as watches and radios, presumably intended as gifts for GIs to purchase at post exchanges. By 1967, APA purchases included equipment needed for the repair and construction of roads, bridges, and other facilities. The Japanese also got over 500,000 freight cars from Japanese manufacturers.

Although Japanese industry refrained from selling weapons or munitions for use in Vietnam, petrochemical companies enjoyed a brisk trade in "precursor" chemicals used to manufacture napalm, TNT, and other explosives. In the late 1960s, these sales totaled between \$150 and \$300 million per year. Electronic manufacturers, such as Sony, built no weapons but sold the APA guidance systems used in military aircraft, missiles, and bombs. MITI deleted many of these sales from its procurement calculations, claiming that it lacked detailed knowledge about the total value or end use of material sold privately to the U.S. military.⁴³

Japan accrued another benefit from recreational (R&R) spending by Americans. Between 1966 and 1969, about 50,000 military personnel stationed in Southeast Asia visited Japan annually. Hotels and travel agencies bid for contracts to serve the troops brought in on air charters. The stays. Hotels provided a billet, loaned the soldiers civilian clothes, and arranged for their entertainment, somewhat as had been done during the early Occupation. Each servicemen spent about \$100 per day, earning Japan a minimum of \$25 million a year.⁴⁴

distinct from his "diary," which he dictated at night; Nixon's private secretary, Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York, 1994), 140.